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ALL HAZARDS ARE NOT EQUAl.

/

This booklet is one in a series designed to enhance
the understanding of the private enterprise system
and the key forces affecting it. The series will proviae a forum for considering vital current issues in
public policy and for communicating these views
to a wide audience in the business, government,
and academic communities. Publications will
include papers and speeches, conference proceedings, and other research results of the Center for
the Study of American Business.

While there are no perfect indices to measure trends taking place in
technology and innovation, the evidence presented by changes in some
very important indicators strongly suggests that a slowdown has been
occuring. In teal terms (constant 1972 dollars), research and development
spending in the United States has been on a plateau of slightly under
thirty billion dollars a year since 1965. In the private sector, research and
development, which rose at an annual rate of more than seven percent
from 1953 to 1957, bas been increasing at a more modest one percent a
year since.
The employment of scientists and engineers in industry decreased by
fifteen thousand in 1975 from 1,046,000 in 1968. Enrollments for
advanced degrees in science and engineering have represented a steadily
· shrinking share of college enrollments since 1965. The U.S. Patent Office
issued fewer patents to U.S. citizens in 1973 than in 1963, but issued
more than double the number of patents to foreign nationals in 1973 than
in 1963.
A key to future trends in innovative activity lies in the commitment to
basic research, as opposed to overall research and development, which
includes not only product development but also research dedicated to
fulfilling regulatory requirements and minimizing liability exposure.
Federal funding of basic research has declined since 1968 (in constant
1967 dollars) and industry funding began a modest rate of decline in 1971.
In its forecast of research and development expenditures for 1977, Battelle
Columbus Laboratories noted that the shift from basic to pragmatic
research continues, particularly in industry where the change has been
toward "defensive" research because of "growing governmental emphasis
on environmental protection, occupational safety and health, and consumer
safeguards." To be sure, the overall slowdown in research and development
outlays is the result of multiple causes, such as the shift in federal spending
priorities from defense to social welfare programs.

Mr. Weidenbaum is Director and Mr. Chilton is Assistant Director of the Center for the Study
of American Business at Washington University- in St. Louis, Missouri.
I
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Government Regulation
What is the role of government regulation in the slowdown? First, let us
state the obvious: government regulation often has yielded important
benefits- less pollution, fewer product hazards, reduced job
discrimination and other socially desirable objectives. These government
programs were established in response to rising public expectations about
business performance. But the worthiness of these social objectives should
not make the specific methods being used in attempting to achieve them
totally immune from criticism.
At first blush, government imposition of socially desirable requirements
on business through the regulatory process appears to be an inexpensive
way of achieving national objectives. The practice apparently costs the
government little and represents no significant direct burden on the
taxpayer. But the public does not escape paying the cost. Every time, for
example, that the Environmental Protection Agency imposes a more costly
(and perhaps less polluting) method of production on any firm, the cost of
the company's products to the consumer will rise. Similar effects flow
from the other regulatory efforts, including those involving product safety,
job health and equal employment opportunity.
These higher prices, we need to come to recognize, represent the
~~hidden tax" of regulation which is shifted from the government to the
consumer. It is not inevitable that every regulatory activity increases
inflationary pressures. In those instances where regulation generates social
benefits (such as a healthier and thus more productive work force) in
excess of the social costs it imposes, inflationary pressures should be
reduced. But if the costs are ignored and the focus of public policy is only
on the benefits, it is almost inevitable that the regulation will be pushed
beyond the point where the benefits equal the costs and into the zone of
~~overregulation." Overregulation, to an economist, is not an emotional
term, but merely the shorthand for situations where the costs imposed by
regulation exceed the benefits from the regulation.
At times the impact of regulation on the prices that consumers pay is
direct and visible. For example, in the case of the passenger automobile,
the federal government has required the producers to incorporate a wide
variety of specified safety and environmental features. For the average new
car sold in the U.S., those government-mandated requirements add a cost of
approximately $666 (or more than seven billion dollars a year for all the new
vehicles purchased). We are not justified, however, in jumping to either
extreme conclusion - that there are no offsetting benefits or that the
benefits are overwhelming. But surely, drivers and their passengers who
always put on seat belts derive no benefit from the expensive and
annoying buzzing contraptions mandated by the federal government.
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Government regulation also pushes up prices indirectly, by increasing
the overhead costs of producing goods and services. There are more than
four thousand different types of federal forms which must be filled out, in
addition to tax and banking forms. Business firms and individuals spend
more than 143 million hours a year filling them out. Consider these
examples: A small five-thousand watt radio station in New Hampshire
spent more than $26 just to mail its application for renewal of its license
to the Federal Communications Commission. That was before the last
postal rate increase. An Oregon company, operating three small television
stations, reported that its license renewal application weighed 45 pounds.
At the other end of the size spectrum, the Exxon Company is required
to file more than four hundred reports each year to 45 federal agencies.
The Standard Oil Company of Indiana maintains 636 miles of computer
tape just to store the data that it must supply to the Department of
Energy.

Economic Growth
Federal regulation also affects the prospects for economic growth and
productivity by levying a claim on a rising share of new capital formation.
This impact is most evident in the environmental and safety areas.
According to the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, private outlays
for pollution control in the United States in 1976 were six and a half
billion dollars higher than would have been the case in the absence of
federal ecological requirements. Similarly, the McGraw-Hill Department of
Economics estimates the cost to American industry of meeting the
occupational health and safety regulations at $3.2 billion in 1976. These
two programs alone account for about six percent of total capital spendinQ
in the private sector of the American economy.
Capital formation is also adversely affected by the uncertainty about the
future of regulations governing the introduction of new processes and
products. Take this example from the energy area: A task force of the
President's Energy Resources Council, in evaluating the requirement for
environmental impact statements, claims that the major uncertainty was
not whether a project would be allowed to proceed, but rather the length
of time that it would be delayed pending the issuance of an environmental
impact statement that would stand up in court. In assessing the overall
impact of government regulatory activity on the establishment of a new
energy industry, the task force concluded" ... some of these requirements
could easily hold up or permanently postpone any attempt to build and
operate a synthetic fuels plant."
3

In the occupational safety and health area, professional safety staffs are
often diverted from their basic function of training workers in safer
operating procedures to filling out forms, posting notices, and meeting
other essentially bureaucratic requirements. And so, we find safety
personnel answering such trivial questions as: How big is a hole? When is a
roof a floor? How frequently must spittoons be cleaned? Of greater
concern, no doubt, is the detail of the regulations. Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) directives, for example, contain very
specific requirements for virtually every piece of equipment used in the
production of steel. These requirements range from such major items as
coke ovens all the way down to such minutiae as the ladders used in plants
and the mandatory 42-inch height from the floor for portable fire
extinguishers. The results measured by any improvement in safety are
almost invariably disappointing. The number of workdays lost to injury
and illness per one hundred workers in American industry rose from 53.1
in 1974 to 54.4 in 1975.

Innovation
The hidden cost of government regulation that potentially is perhaps
the most costly of all is a reduced rate of introduction of new products
and manufacturing processes. The longer it takes for a new product or
production technique to be approved by a government agency- or the
more costly the approval process- the less likely that the new product
will be created. In any event, innovation will be delayed. The banning or
forcing out of existing products likewise has a negative effect on the
incentive to proceed with new products that may be rejected on similar
grounds.
The saccharin case, while the best known, is not an isolated example of
proposed product bans based on the zero risk approach to health and
safety. In August 1975, the National Cancer Institute reported that the
solvent trichlorethylene, known as TCE, might be a possible cause of
cancer. TCE at the time was used in decaffeinated coffee. The government
used a generous dose of the chemical on test animals- the equivalent of a
human being drinking fifty million cups of decaffeinated coffee every day
for an entire lifetime. But did the industry laugh at or ignore the
government's report? Hardly. With the cyclamate episode still firmly in
mind and a saccharin ban being seriously considered, one major producer
quickly changed to another chemical.
Or, turning to the chemical industry- one of the largest technically
oriented sectors of the American economy - more than twenty federal
laws c<>ver the regulation of chemicals, ranging from the Consumer
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Product Safety Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act to the Clean Air, Clean Water, and Solid Waste
Disposal Acts. A newcomer to the scene is the Toxic Substances
Control Act (Tosca) of 1976. The concern within the industry is that
Tosca will have a severe impact on the entire industry in the same way
the 1962 Food and Drug Act Amendments affected the pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
Sam Peltzman of the University. of Chicago has estimated that the
1962 amendments to the Food and Drug Act are delaying the
introduction of effective drugs by about four years, as well as leading to
higher prices for drugs. Due in large part to the stringent drug approval
regulations, the U.S. is no longer the leader in introducing new
medicines. According to William Wardell of the University of Rochester
School of Medicine, we were the thirtieth country to approve the antiasthma drug meta-proterenol, the thirty-second to approve the anti-cancer
drug adriamycin, the fifty-first to approve the anti-tuberculosis drug
rifampin, and the sixty-fourth to approve the anti-bacterial drug
co-trimaxazole.
Henry Grabowski and John Vernon of Duke University report that
the more stringent Food and Drug Administration regulation of
pharmaceuticals over recent years has been a major cause of higher costs,
time lags and rising risk in pharmaceutical innovation. They contend that
increased regulation alone accounts for the doubling in the cost of
developing and introducing a new chemical entity in the U.S. What's
more, they conclude that innovation has become increasingly
concentrated in the large, multi-national drug companies, apparently
because these firms are better able to bear the additional costs and risks
of innovation than smaller firms and, in addition, because they can shift
resources on a worldwide basis.
The shift, away from basic research toward evolutionary or applied
research is already evident among chemical manufacturers. Chemical and
Engineering News (October 3, 1977) noted that "DuPont, the U.S.
chemical industry's leader in research and development spending, has,
over the past few years, shown a notable retrenchment in its real-dollar
research and development support. In the process, the company has
shifted many of its research and development efforts from new venture
research to work on established product lines ... "
In addition, "defensive" research is competing with basic research for
the research and development budget dollar. Monsanto found that
thirteen percent of its research was spent on compliance and therefore
reorganized its research and development efforts into two parallel
organizations, one traditional and a new Environmental Policy Staff.
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Pesticide manufacturers form a subgroup of the chemical industry
that has already experienced the effects of direct regulation under the
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act. Harold L. Straube, vice
president of Stauffer Chemical and at one time president of the
National Agricultural Chemicals Association, believes that "government
meddling in terms of excessive regulation has skyrocketed the costs of
doing business to a level we never thought possible ... a climate is
being developed in which research and development could grind to a
halt." He noted that in 1967 the cost to discover and commercialize
a new pesticide was three million four hundred thousand dollars and the
average time lag was five years but the 1976 figures are eight million
dollars and eight years.

Delaney Amendment
Surely the Delaney Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
is worthy of some attention as a prime example of the futility of a zero
risk approach to health and safety regulation. That statute prohibits the
use of any chemical substance (in any amount) as a food additive if
that substance has been found, by "appropriate" tests, to induce cancer
in human beings or laboratory animals. A major problem becoming
increasingly evident is that scientific progress over the last twenty years
has brought about a ten thousand to one million times improvement in
the ability to measure "any amount."
The requirement to enforce the Delaney Amendment led the FDA to
ban the use of acrylonitrile (AN) in beverage bottles effective January
1978. Since tests by Monsanto (the company with the largest
investment in the AN bottle) indicated a migration of an average of
ten parts per billion from the bottle to the beverage after six months
at room temperature, AN must be considered to be a "food additive"
from the FDA's point of view. Thus the only question is whether AN
has been "appropriately" tested and adjudged a carcinogen. In banning
the AN bottle, FDA commissioner Donald Kennedy said, "The record
shows AN is a frank teratogen in the rat, a tumorigen and probable
carcinogen in the rat, a possible carcinogen in man, and a mutagen in
several test systems. Under these circumstances, it is inconceivable that
the scientific community could recognize that any level of AN has
been shown through scientific procedures to be safe."
The manufacturer m.ust prove that there is a "safe" level of a
"probable" carcinogen that may be consumed by human beings.
Monsanto states that the lowest level of feeding that showed harm to
animals requires, in human terms, that a child drink three thousand
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bottles of soda every day for life in order to duplicate the test
conditions. The company further points out the impossibility of
producing products with zero risk as carcinogens through the example
of lettuce. Lettuce contains nickel, a metal which causes cancer and
would therefore, if commercially produced, have to be banned under
the Delaney Amendment. The fact that we do not drop face down in
our salad bowls indicates that the human organism must have a
tolerance for some level of nickel - how much is the serious but
unanswered scientific question.
The inconsistency in federal policy, however, is awesome. Compare
the counsel of perfection implicit in the Delaney Amendment's attitude
toward food additives with the government's position on tobacco. The
American Cancer Society recently has forecasted three hundred ninety
thousand cancer deaths in the United States in 1978. Nearly one in
four of these deaths will be from lung cancer, twenty percent of which
is due to smoking. What is so incongruous is that the U.S. government
subsidizes a proven carcinogen through its price support of tobacco
administered by the Department of Agriculture.

Common Sense
What action might the optimist envision? First of all, a large measure
of common sense is needed on the part of our elected officials and civil
serv~nts responsible for drafting and enforcing regulations. They must
know that a totally risk-free environment is an impractical objective.
Literally realized, it would put us back ir:1 the Stone Age, which was
hardly a safe period for human existence.
Any realistic appraisal must acknowledge that important and positive
benefits have resulted from many of the government's regulatory
activities. It should also be realized that the American people have a
right to expect business to respond to the public's desire for less
pollution, fewer product hazards, and protection from unknown health
hazards. But the worthiness of social objectives does not justify
government closely regulating every facet of private behavior. Indeed,
the experience with existing governmental efforts shows that further
expansion of government involvement in the detail of business decisionmaking is likely to be self-defeating.
To be sure, the exercise of judgment in regulatory matters can involve
striking a balance in some extremely difficult areas, literally affecting
human life. As a former commissioner of food and drugs, Alexander
Schmidt, has said, "In FDA decisions, as in all aspects of human
endeavor, we must accept the probability of nonexistence of absolute
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safety." He goes on to raise some very difficult questions: Just where
and when does one draw the line in weighing demonstrable benefit
against theoretical risk? Who is to draw the line? Government or
industry or the individual consumer? Schmidt criticized the anticancer clauses in existing food safety laws because, literally interpreted,
they leave no room for scientific judgment, calling for zero risk from
all ·new food ingredients.
There is a real need for scientists in industry and the universities to
take part in the debates on regulation. William Baker of Bell
Laboratories has suggested that industry and university researchers
should work as equal partners in defining the appropriate regulatory
systems. He says that such a partnership 11 WOuld help overcome the
often negative influence of special interest groups and of naive
generalizations about science and engineering in setting regulatory
policies."

Restraint
A new attitude of restraint in imposing additional regulations on the
private sector would lower the risk and the cost of research and
development by business. We need to adopt sensible, operational notions
of practical threshold levels and of toxicological insignificance. To put
it bluntly, all hazards are not equal. Government policy needs to make
such distinctions as between hidden and visible hazards, voluntary and
involuntary hazards, easily avoidable and hard-to-avoid hazards, remote
and commonplace hazards, and negligible and severe hazards.
Such a new attitude would have a salutary effect on the pace of
technological innovation and scientific progress in the Unitetl States.
The benefits would be widespread. They would include lower prices
for American consumers, greater job opportunities for workers and
ultimately an improved quality of life for the average citizen.
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